tag:piggydb.net,2009:db-20121217124623252:tag-112013-09-15T22:06:41.933+00:00Piggydb Knowledge Example - integrityPiggydbtag:piggydb.net,2009:db-20121217124623252.fragment-1402013-09-15T22:06:41.933+00:002013-09-15T22:06:41.933+00:00An experiential gestalt will typically serve as a background for understanding something we experience as an aspect of that gestalt
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"Background: An experiential gestalt will typically serve as a background for understanding something we experience as an aspect of that gestalt. Thus a person or object may be understood as a participant in a gestalt, and an action may be understood as a part of a gestalt. One gestalt may presuppose the presence of another, which may, in turn, presuppose the presence of others, and so on. The result will typically be an incredibly rich background structure necessary for a full understanding of any given situation. Most of this background structure will never be noticed, since it is presupposed in so many of our daily activities and experiences." (<a class="quick-viewable" data-id="60" href="http://piggydb.jp/example/fragment.htm?id=60">#60</a> 3003)
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ownertag:piggydb.net,2009:db-20121217124623252.fragment-1062013-09-08T22:42:04.17+00:002013-09-15T22:02:56.727+00:00experiential gestalt
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"experiential gestalts are multidimensional structured wholes. Their dimensions, in turn, are defined in terms of directly emergent concepts. That is, the various dimensions (participants, parts, stages, etc.) are categories that emerge naturally from our experience." (<a class="quick-viewable" data-id="60" href="http://piggydb.jp/example/fragment.htm?id=60">#60</a> 1465)
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"We have already seen that causation is a directly emergent concept, and the other dimensions in terms of which we categorize our experience have a fairly obvious experiential basis: Participants, Parts, Stages, Linear sequence, Purpose" (<a class="quick-viewable" data-id="60" href="http://piggydb.jp/example/fragment.htm?id=60">#60</a> 1467)
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"We have so far characterized coherence in terms of experiential gestalts, which have various dimensions that emerge naturally from experience. Some gestalts are relatively simple (CONVERSATION) and some are extremely elaborate (WAR)." (<a class="quick-viewable" data-id="60" href="http://piggydb.jp/example/fragment.htm?id=60">#60</a> 1527)
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"Experiential gestalts: Our object and substance categories are gestalts that have at least the following dimensions: perceptual, motor activity, part/whole, functional, purposive. Our categories of direct actions, activities, events, and experiences are gestalts that have at least the following dimensions: participants, parts, motor activities, perceptions, stages, linear sequences (of parts), causal relations, purpose (goals/plans for actions and end states for events). These constitute the natural dimensions of our direct experience. Not all of them will play a role in every kind of direct experience, but, in general, most of them will play some role or other." (<a class="quick-viewable" data-id="60" href="http://piggydb.jp/example/fragment.htm?id=60">#60</a> 2997)
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ownertag:piggydb.net,2009:db-20121217124623252.fragment-982013-09-08T20:17:12.227+00:002013-09-08T20:53:17.356+00:00prototypical direct manipulations
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"Piaget has hypothesized that infants first learn about causation by realizing that they can directly manipulate objects around them—pull off their blankets, throw their bottles, drop toys. There is, in fact, a stage in which infants seem to "practice" these manipulations, e.g., they repeatedly drop their spoons. Such direct manipulations, even on the part of infants, involve certain shared features that characterize the notion of direct causation that is so integral a part of our constant everyday functioning in our environment—as when we flip light switches, button our shirts, open doors, etc. Though each of these actions is different, the overwhelming proportion of them share features of what we may call a "prototypical" or "paradigmatic" case of direct causation." (<a class="quick-viewable" data-id="60" href="http://piggydb.jp/example/fragment.htm?id=60">#60</a> 1256)
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"These shared features include: The agent has as a goal some change of state in the patient. The change of state is physical. The agent has a "plan" for carrying out this goal. The plan requires the agent's use of a motor program. The agent is in control of that motor program. The agent is primarily responsible for carrying out the plan. The agent is the energy source (i.e., the agent is directing his energies toward the patient), and the patient is the energy goal (i.e., the change in the patient is due to an external source of energy). The agent touches the patient either with his body or an instrument (i.e., there is a spatiotemporal overlap between what the agent does and the change in the patient). The agent successfully carries out the plan. The change in the patient is perceptible. The agent monitors the change in the patient through sensory perception. There is a single specific agent and a single specific patient." (<a class="quick-viewable" data-id="60" href="http://piggydb.jp/example/fragment.htm?id=60">#60</a> 1261)
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"(In physical causation the agent and patient are events, a physical law takes the place of plan, goal, and motor activity, and all of the peculiarly human aspects are factored out.)" (<a class="quick-viewable" data-id="60" href="http://piggydb.jp/example/fragment.htm?id=60">#60</a> 1285)
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ownertag:piggydb.net,2009:db-20121217124623252.fragment-1002013-09-08T20:49:45.328+00:002013-09-08T20:49:45.328+00:00the complex of properties occurring together is more basic to our experience than their separate occurrence
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"They recur together over and over in action after action as we go through our daily lives. We experience them as a gestalt; that is, the complex of properties occurring together is more basic to our experience than their separate occurrence. Through their constant recurrence in our everyday functioning, the <a class="tag" href="http://piggydb.jp/example/tag.htm?name=category">category</a> of causation emerges with this complex of properties characterizing prototypical causations." (<a class="quick-viewable" data-id="60" href="http://piggydb.jp/example/fragment.htm?id=60">#60</a> 1280)
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ownertag:piggydb.net,2009:db-20121217124623252.fragment-992013-09-08T20:43:06.206+00:002013-09-08T20:43:06.206+00:00people categorize objects, not in set-theoretical terms, but in terms of prototypes and family resemblances
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"We are using the word "prototypical" in the sense Rosch uses it in her theory of human categorization (1977). Her experiments indicate that people categorize objects, not in set-theoretical terms, but in terms of <a class="tag" href="http://piggydb.jp/example/tag.htm?name=prototypes">prototypes</a> and family resemblances. For example, small flying singing birds, like sparrows, robins, etc., are prototypical birds. Chickens, ostriches, and penguins are birds but are not central members of the <a class="tag" href="http://piggydb.jp/example/tag.htm?name=category">category</a>—they are nonprototypical birds. But they are birds nonetheless, because they bear sufficient family resemblances to the prototype; that is, they share enough of the relevant properties of the prototype to be classified by people as birds." (<a class="quick-viewable" data-id="60" href="http://piggydb.jp/example/fragment.htm?id=60">#60</a> 1274)
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ownertag:piggydb.net,2009:db-20121217124623252.fragment-962013-09-08T19:49:19.170+00:002013-09-08T19:52:52.14+00:00causation is best understood as an experiential gestalt
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"We would like to suggest instead that causation is best understood as an experiential gestalt. A proper understanding of causation requires that it be viewed as a cluster of other components. But the cluster forms a gestalt—a whole that we human beings find more basic than the parts." (<a class="quick-viewable" data-id="60" href="http://piggydb.jp/example/fragment.htm?id=60">#60</a> 1253)
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