The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another

"The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another." (#60 158)
"we are understanding one thing in terms of something else of the same kind. But in conventional metaphor, we are understanding one thing in terms of something else of a different kind." (#60 2910)
"an understanding of truth in terms of metaphorical projection is not essentially different from an understanding of truth in terms of nonmetaphorical projection. The only difference is that metaphorical projection involves understanding one kind of thing in terms of another kind of thing. That is, metaphorical projection involves two different kinds of things, while nonmetaphorical projection involves only one kind." (#60 2920)

metaphor is typically based on cross-domain correlations in our experience

"metaphor is, in general, not based on similarity, as we argued throughout this book. Instead, it is typically based on cross-domain correlations in our experience, which give rise to the perceived similarities between the two domains within the metaphor. For example, the persistent use of a metaphor may create perceived similarities, as when a love relationship, conceived of metaphorically as a partnership, goes awry when responsibilities and benefits are not shared equally." (#60 4003)

experiential correlations: experiential cooccurrence and experiential similarity → ...

"Our general position is that conceptual metaphors are grounded in correlations within our experience. These experiential correlations may be of two types: experiential cooccurrence and experiential similarity. An example of experiential cooccurrence would be the MORE IS UP metaphor, more is up is grounded in the cooccurrence of two types of experiences: adding more of a substance and seeing the level of the substance rise. Here there is no experiential similarity at all. An example of experiential similarity is LIFE IS A GAMBLING GAME, where one experiences actions in life as gambles, and the possible consequences of those actions are perceived as winning or losing. Here the metaphor seems to be grounded in experiential similarity. When such a metaphor is extended, we may experience new similarities between life and gambling games." (#60 2680)

target domain / source domain

"In a metaphor, there are two domains: the target domain, which is constituted by the immediate subject matter, and the source domain, in which important metaphorical reasoning takes place and that provides the source concepts used in that reasoning. Metaphorical language has literal meaning in the source domain. In addition, a metaphoric mapping is multiple, that is, two or more elements are mapped to two or more other elements. Image-schema structure is preserved in the mapping—interiors of containers map to interiors, exteriors map to exteriors; sources of motion to sources, goals to goals, and so on." (#60 4307)

we tend to structure the less concrete and inherently vaguer concepts in terms of more concrete concepts

"We find that Β (the defining concept) is more clearly delineated in our experience and typically more concrete than A (the defined concept). Moreover, there is always more in the defining concept than is carried over to the defined concept." (#60 1923)
"We have explained this asymmetry in the following way: the less clearly delineated (and usually less concrete) concepts are partially understood in terms of the more clearly delineated (and usually more concrete) concepts, which are directly grounded in our experience." (#60 1926)
"we tend to structure the less concrete and inherently vaguer concepts (like those for the emotions) in terms of more concrete concepts, which are more clearly delineated in our experience." (#60 1977)
"We have seen that metaphor pervades our normal conceptual system. Because so many of the concepts that are important to us are either abstract or not clearly delineated in our experience (the emotions, ideas, time, etc.), we need to get a grasp on them by means of other concepts that we understand in clearer terms (spatial orientations, objects, etc.)." (#60 2012)

many aspects of our experience cannot be clearly delineated in terms of the naturally emergent dimensions of our experience

"many aspects of our experience cannot be clearly delineated in terms of the naturally emergent dimensions of our experience. This is typically the case for human emotions, abstract concepts, mental activity, time, work, human institutions, social practices, etc., and even for physical objects that have no inherent boundaries or orientations. Though most of these can be experienced directly, none of them can be fully comprehended on their own terms. Instead, we must understand them in terms of other entities and experiences, typically other kinds of entities and experiences." (#60 3020)

we typically conceptualize the nonphysical in terms of the physical → ...

"what we are claiming about grounding is that we typically conceptualize the nonphysical in terms of the physical—that is, we conceptualize the less clearly delineated in terms of the more clearly delineated." (#60 1100)

direct physical experience → ...

"what we call "direct physical experience" is never merely a matter of having a body of a certain sort; rather, every experience takes place within a vast background of cultural presuppositions." (#60 1067)
"It can be misleading, therefore, to speak of direct physical experience as though there were some core of immediate experience which we then "interpret" in terms of our conceptual system." (#60 1068)

interactional properties → ...

"Because defining concepts (JOURNEYS, MADNESS, WAR, HEALTH) emerge from our interactions with one another and with the world, the concept they metaphorically define (e.g., LOVE) will be understood in terms of what we will call interactional properties." (#60 2083)

Which part we pick out determines which aspect of the whole we are focusing on

"Which part we pick out determines which aspect of the whole we are focusing on." (#60 680)

THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS metaphor

"the metaphor THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS has a "used" part (foundation and outer shell) and an "unused" part (rooms, staircases, etc.)." (#60 1001)
"literal expressions ("He has constructed a theory") and imaginative expressions ("His theory is covered with gargoyles") can be instances of the same general metaphor (THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS)." (#60 1011)

the heart of metaphor is inference

"The heart of metaphor is inference. Conceptual metaphor allows inferences in sensory-motor domains (e. g., domains of space and objects) to be used to draw inferences about other domains (e. g., domains of subjective judgment, with concepts like intimacy, emotions, justice, and so on). Because we reason in terms of metaphor, the metaphors we use determine a great deal about how we live our lives." (#60 3994)

All metaphors are structural; all are ontological; and many are orientational

"The division of metaphors into three types—orienta-tional, ontological, and structural—was artificial. All metaphors are structural (in that they map structures to structures); all are ontological (in that they create target domain entities); and many are orientational (in that they map orientational image-schemas)." (#60 4298)

structural metaphors → ...

"Structural metaphors (such as RATIONAL ARGUMENT IS WAR) provide the richest source of such elaboration. Structural metaphors allow us to do much more than just orient concepts, refer to them, quantify them, etc., as we do with simple orientational and ontological metaphors; they allow us, in addition, to use one highly structured and clearly delineated concept to structure another." (#60 1119)

idiosyncratic metaphorical expressions

"there are idiosyncratic metaphorical expressions that stand alone and are not used systematically in our language or thought. These are well-known expressions like the foot of the mountain, a head of cabbage, the leg of a table, etc. These expressions are isolated instances of metaphorical concepts, where there is only one instance of a used part (or maybe two or three). Thus the foot of the mountain is the only used part of the metaphor A MOUNTAIN IS A PERSON"(#60 1029)
"their used part may consist of only one conventionally fixed expression of the language, and they do not systematically interact with other metaphorical concepts because so little of them is used." (#60 1037)
"Examples like the foot of the mountain are idiosyncratic, unsystematic, and isolated." (#60 1041)
"It is important to distinguish these isolated and unsystematic cases from the systematic metaphorical expressions we have been discussing." (#60 1046)

subcategorization and metaphor are endpoints on a continuum

"we have been assuming a clear-cut distinction between subcategorization and metaphorical structuring." (#60 1503)
"we took "An argument is a conversation" to be an instance of subcategorization, because an argument is basically a kind of conversation." (#60 1504)
"subcategorization and metaphor are endpoints on a continuum." (#60 1519)

arguments

"We construct arguments when we need to show the connections between things that are obvious—that we take for granted—and other things that are not obvious. We do this by putting ideas together. These ideas constitute the content of the argument. The things we take for granted are the starting point of the argument. The things we wish to show are the goals that we must reach. As we proceed toward these goals, we make progress by establishing connections. The connections may be strong or weak, and the network of connections has an overall structure. In any argument certain ideas and connections may be more basic than others, certain ideas will be more obvious than others. How good an argument is will depend on its content, the strength of the connections, how directly it establishes the connections, and how easy it is to understand the connections." (#60 1730)