"Metaphors We Live By" by George Lakoff, Mark Johnson

"metaphor is, in general, not based on similarity, as we argued throughout this book. Instead, it is typically based on cross-domain correlations in our experience, which give rise to the perceived similarities between the two domains within the metaphor. For example, the persistent use of a metaphor may create perceived similarities, as when a love relationship, conceived of metaphorically as a partnership, goes awry when responsibilities and benefits are not shared equally." (#60 4003)

"In a metaphor, there are two domains: the target domain, which is constituted by the immediate subject matter, and the source domain, in which important metaphorical reasoning takes place and that provides the source concepts used in that reasoning. Metaphorical language has literal meaning in the source domain. In addition, a metaphoric mapping is multiple, that is, two or more elements are mapped to two or more other elements. Image-schema structure is preserved in the mapping—interiors of containers map to interiors, exteriors map to exteriors; sources of motion to sources, goals to goals, and so on." (#60 4307)

"We find that Β (the defining concept) is more clearly delineated in our experience and typically more concrete than A (the defined concept). Moreover, there is always more in the defining concept than is carried over to the defined concept." (#60 1923)

"We have explained this asymmetry in the following way: the less clearly delineated (and usually less concrete) concepts are partially understood in terms of the more clearly delineated (and usually more concrete) concepts, which are directly grounded in our experience." (#60 1926)

"we tend to structure the less concrete and inherently vaguer concepts (like those for the emotions) in terms of more concrete concepts, which are more clearly delineated in our experience." (#60 1977)

"We have seen that metaphor pervades our normal conceptual system. Because so many of the concepts that are important to us are either abstract or not clearly delineated in our experience (the emotions, ideas, time, etc.), we need to get a grasp on them by means of other concepts that we understand in clearer terms (spatial orientations, objects, etc.)." (#60 2012)

"Which part we pick out determines which aspect of the whole we are focusing on." (#60 680)

"The heart of metaphor is inference. Conceptual metaphor allows inferences in sensory-motor domains (e. g., domains of space and objects) to be used to draw inferences about other domains (e. g., domains of subjective judgment, with concepts like intimacy, emotions, justice, and so on). Because we reason in terms of metaphor, the metaphors we use determine a great deal about how we live our lives." (#60 3994)

"The division of metaphors into three types—orienta-tional, ontological, and structural—was artificial. All metaphors are structural (in that they map structures to structures); all are ontological (in that they create target domain entities); and many are orientational (in that they map orientational image-schemas)." (#60 4298)

"there are idiosyncratic metaphorical expressions that stand alone and are not used systematically in our language or thought. These are well-known expressions like the foot of the mountain, a head of cabbage, the leg of a table, etc. These expressions are isolated instances of metaphorical concepts, where there is only one instance of a used part (or maybe two or three). Thus the foot of the mountain is the only used part of the metaphor A MOUNTAIN IS A PERSON"(#60 1029)

"their used part may consist of only one conventionally fixed expression of the language, and they do not systematically interact with other metaphorical concepts because so little of them is used." (#60 1037)

"Examples like the foot of the mountain are idiosyncratic, unsystematic, and isolated." (#60 1041)

"It is important to distinguish these isolated and unsystematic cases from the systematic metaphorical expressions we have been discussing." (#60 1046)

"we have been assuming a clear-cut distinction between subcategorization and metaphorical structuring." (#60 1503)

"we took "An argument is a conversation" to be an instance of subcategorization, because an argument is basically a kind of conversation." (#60 1504)

"subcategorization and metaphor are endpoints on a continuum." (#60 1519)

"We construct arguments when we need to show the connections between things that are obvious—that we take for granted—and other things that are not obvious. We do this by putting ideas together. These ideas constitute the content of the argument. The things we take for granted are the starting point of the argument. The things we wish to show are the goals that we must reach. As we proceed toward these goals, we make progress by establishing connections. The connections may be strong or weak, and the network of connections has an overall structure. In any argument certain ideas and connections may be more basic than others, certain ideas will be more obvious than others. How good an argument is will depend on its content, the strength of the connections, how directly it establishes the connections, and how easy it is to understand the connections." (#60 1730)

"Our concepts structure what we perceive, how we get around in the world, and how we relate to other people. Our conceptual system thus plays a central role in defining our everyday realities. If we are right in suggesting that our conceptual system is largely metaphorical, then the way we think, what we experience, and what we do every day is very much a matter of metaphor." (#60 125)

"Since communication is based on the same conceptual system that we use in thinking and acting, language is an important source of evidence for what that system is like." (#60 130)

"The idea that metaphors can create realities goes against most traditional views of metaphor. The reason is that metaphor has traditionally been viewed as a matter of mere language rather than primarily as a means of structuring our conceptual system and the kinds of everyday activities we perform." (#60 2536)

"Not surprisingly, the social reality defined by a culture affects its conception of physical reality. What is real for an individual as a member of a culture is a product both of his social reality and of the way in which that shapes his experience of the physical world. Since much of our social reality is understood in metaphorical terms, and since our conception of the physical world is partly metaphorical, metaphor plays a very significant role in determining what is real for us." (#60 2548)

"Are there any concepts at all that are understood directly, without metaphor?" (#60 1052)

"what we call "direct physical experience" is never merely a matter of having a body of a certain sort; rather, every experience takes place within a vast background of cultural presuppositions." (#60 1067)

"It can be misleading, therefore, to speak of direct physical experience as though there were some core of immediate experience which we then "interpret" in terms of our conceptual system." (#60 1068)

"Because defining concepts (JOURNEYS, MADNESS, WAR, HEALTH) emerge from our interactions with one another and with the world, the concept they metaphorically define (e.g., LOVE) will be understood in terms of what we will call interactional properties." (#60 2083)

"experiential gestalts are multidimensional structured wholes. Their dimensions, in turn, are defined in terms of directly emergent concepts. That is, the various dimensions (participants, parts, stages, etc.) are categories that emerge naturally from our experience." (#60 1465)

"We have already seen that causation is a directly emergent concept, and the other dimensions in terms of which we categorize our experience have a fairly obvious experiential basis: Participants, Parts, Stages, Linear sequence, Purpose" (#60 1467)

"We have so far characterized coherence in terms of experiential gestalts, which have various dimensions that emerge naturally from experience. Some gestalts are relatively simple (CONVERSATION) and some are extremely elaborate (WAR)." (#60 1527)

"Experiential gestalts: Our object and substance categories are gestalts that have at least the following dimensions: perceptual, motor activity, part/whole, functional, purposive. Our categories of direct actions, activities, events, and experiences are gestalts that have at least the following dimensions: participants, parts, motor activities, perceptions, stages, linear sequences (of parts), causal relations, purpose (goals/plans for actions and end states for events). These constitute the natural dimensions of our direct experience. Not all of them will play a role in every kind of direct experience, but, in general, most of them will play some role or other." (#60 2997)

"Grady showed that complex metaphors arise from primary metaphors that are directly grounded in the everyday experience that links our sensory-motor experience to the domain of our subjective judgments." (#60 4152)

"There are primary metaphors for time, causation, events, morality, emotions, and other domains that are central to human thought. Such metaphors also provide a superstructure for our systems of complex metaphorical thought and language." (#60 4184)

"Primary metaphor is a term named by Joseph Grady for the basic connection that exist between subjective or abstract experiences such as good and concrete experiences such as up. These two concepts usually correlate in experience, and form the primary metaphor good is up. Likewise there is a correlation between seeing and knowing forming the primary metaphor seeing is knowing. Two such primary metaphors are used when understanding an expression such as glass ceiling." - Wikipedia

"Our general position is that conceptual metaphors are grounded in correlations within our experience. These experiential correlations may be of two types: experiential cooccurrence and experiential similarity. An example of experiential cooccurrence would be the MORE IS UP metaphor, more is up is grounded in the cooccurrence of two types of experiences: adding more of a substance and seeing the level of the substance rise. Here there is no experiential similarity at all. An example of experiential similarity is LIFE IS A GAMBLING GAME, where one experiences actions in life as gambles, and the possible consequences of those actions are perceived as winning or losing. Here the metaphor seems to be grounded in experiential similarity. When such a metaphor is extended, we may experience new similarities between life and gambling games." (#60 2680)

"The experientialist myth takes the perspective of man as part of his environment, not as separate from it. It focuses on constant interaction with the physical environment and with other people. It views this interaction with the environment as involving mutual change. You cannot function within the environment without changing it or being changed by it." (#60 3831)

"Ritual forms an indispensable part of the experiential basis for our cultural metaphorical systems. There can be no culture without ritual." (#60 3908)

"Similarly, there can be no coherent view of the self without personal ritual (typically of the casual and spontaneously emerging sort)." (#60 3910)

"the system of conceptual metaphors is not arbitrary or just historically contingent; rather, it is shaped to a significant extent by the common nature of our bodies and the shared ways that we all function in the everyday world." (#60 4008)

"The intuitive appeal of a scientific theory has to do with how well its metaphors fit one's experience." (#60 386)

"We agree with objectivists on one major point: that things in the world do play a role in constraining our conceptual system. But they play this role only through our experience of them. Our experiences will (1) differ from culture to culture and (2) may depend on our understanding one kind of experience in terms of another, that is, our experiences may be metaphorical in nature. Such experiences determine the categories of our conceptual system. And properties and similarities, we maintain, exist and can be experienced only relative to a conceptual system. Thus, the only kind of similarities relevant to metaphors are experiential, not objective, similarities." (#60 2675)

"there are directly emergent concepts (like UP-DOWN, IN-OUT, OBJECT, SUBSTANCE, etc.) and emergent metaphorical concepts based on our experience (like THE VISUAL FIELD IS A CONTAINER, AN ACTIVITY IS A CONTAINER, etc.)." (#60 1242)

"Both directly emergent concepts (like UP-DOWN, OBJECT, and DIRECT MANIPULATION) and metaphors (like HAPPY IS UP, EVENTS ARE OBJECTS, ARGUMENT IS WAR) are grounded in our constant interaction with our physical and cultural environments." (#60 2072)

"Background: An experiential gestalt will typically serve as a background for understanding something we experience as an aspect of that gestalt. Thus a person or object may be understood as a participant in a gestalt, and an action may be understood as a part of a gestalt. One gestalt may presuppose the presence of another, which may, in turn, presuppose the presence of others, and so on. The result will typically be an incredibly rich background structure necessary for a full understanding of any given situation. Most of this background structure will never be noticed, since it is presupposed in so many of our daily activities and experiences." (#60 3003)

"Even in as simple a case as a polite two-party conversation, several dimensions of structure can be seen: Participants, Parts, Stages, Linear sequence, Causation, Purpose" (#60 1385)

"these six dimensions of structure give the main outlines of what is common to typical conversations." (#60 1403)

"Even a concept as basic as CAUSATION is not purely emergent or purely metaphorical. Rather, it appears to have a directly emergent core that is elaborated metaphorically." (#60 1245)

"What constitutes a "basic domain of experience"? Each such domain is a structured whole within our experience that is conceptualized as what we have called an experiential gestalt. Such gestalts are experientially basic because they characterize structured wholes within recurrent human experiences. They represent coherent organizations of our experiences in terms of natural dimensions (parts, stages, causes, etc.). Domains of experience that are organized as gestalts in terms of such natural dimensions seem to us to be natural kinds of experience." (#60 2045)

"these "natural" kinds of experience are products of human nature. Some may be universal, while others will vary from culture to culture." (#60 2055)

"There are also complex gestalts, which are structured partially in terms of other gestalts. These are what we have been calling metaphorically structured concepts. Certain concepts are structured almost entirely metaphorically." (#60 1528)

"The concept LOVE, for example, is structured mostly in metaphorical terms: LOVE IS A JOURNEY, LOVE IS A PATIENT, LOVE IS A PHYSICAL FORCE, LOVE IS MADNESS, LOVE IS WAR, etc." (#60 1530)

"The concept of love has a core that is minimally structured by the subcategorization love is an emotion and by links to other emotions, e.g., liking. This is typical of emotional concepts, which are not clearly delineated in our experience in any direct fashion and therefore must be comprehended primarily indirectly, via metaphor." (#60 1531)

"Some of these entailments are metaphorical (e.g., "Love is an aesthetic experience"); others are not (e.g., "Love involves shared responsibility"). Each of these entailments may itself have further entailments. The result is a large and coherent network of entailments, which may, on the whole, either fit or not fit our experiences of love. When the network does fit, the experiences form a coherent whole as instances of the metaphor. What we experience with such a metaphor is a kind of reverberation down through the network of entailments that awakens and connects our memories of our past love experiences and serves as a possible guide for future ones." (#60 2457)

"there is more to coherence than structuring in terms of multidimensional gestalts. When a concept is structured by more than one metaphor, the different metaphorical structurings usually fit together in a coherent fashion." (#60 1534)

"The difference between coherence and consistency is crucial. Each metaphor focuses on one aspect of the concept ARGUMENT: in this, each serves a single purpose. Moreover, each metaphor allows us to understand one aspect of the concept in terms of a more clearly delineated concept, e.g., JOURNEY OR CONTAINER. The reason we need two metaphors is because there is no one metaphor that will do the job—there is no one metaphor that will allow us to get a handle simultaneously on both the direction of the argument and the content of the argument. These two purposes cannot both be served at once by a single metaphor. And where the purposes won't mix, the metaphors won't mix. Thus we get instances of impermissible mixed metaphors resulting from the impossibility of a single clearly delineated metaphor that satisfies both purposes at once. For example, we can speak of the direction of the argument and of the content of the argument but not of the direction of the content of the argument nor of the content of the direction of the argument." (#60 1687)

"A shared metaphorical entailment can establish a cross-metaphorical correspondence. For example, the shared entailment AS WE MAKE AN ARGUMENT, MORE OF A SURFACE IS CREATED establishes a correspondence between the amount of ground covered in the argument (which is in the JOURNEY metaphor) and the amount of content in the argument (which is in the CONTAINER metaphor)." (#60 1711)

"Where there is an overlapping of purposes, there is an overlapping of metaphors and hence a coherence between them. Permissible mixed metaphors fall into this overlap." (#60 1717)

"experiential gestalts are multidimensional structured wholes. Their dimensions, in turn, are defined in terms of directly emergent concepts. That is, the various dimensions (participants, parts, stages, etc.) are categories that emerge naturally from our experience." (#60 1465)

"We have already seen that causation is a directly emergent concept, and the other dimensions in terms of which we categorize our experience have a fairly obvious experiential basis: Participants, Parts, Stages, Linear sequence, Purpose" (#60 1467)

"We have so far characterized coherence in terms of experiential gestalts, which have various dimensions that emerge naturally from experience. Some gestalts are relatively simple (CONVERSATION) and some are extremely elaborate (WAR)." (#60 1527)

"Experiential gestalts: Our object and substance categories are gestalts that have at least the following dimensions: perceptual, motor activity, part/whole, functional, purposive. Our categories of direct actions, activities, events, and experiences are gestalts that have at least the following dimensions: participants, parts, motor activities, perceptions, stages, linear sequences (of parts), causal relations, purpose (goals/plans for actions and end states for events). These constitute the natural dimensions of our direct experience. Not all of them will play a role in every kind of direct experience, but, in general, most of them will play some role or other." (#60 2997)

"The metaphorical concepts TIME IS MONEY, TIME IS A RESOURCE, and TIME IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY form a single system based on subcategorization, since in our society money is a limited resource and limited resources are valuable commodities. These subcategorization relationships characterize entailment relationships between the metaphors. TIME IS MONEY entails that TIME IS A LIMITED RESOURCE, which entails that TIME IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY." (#60 209)

"The division of metaphors into three types—orienta-tional, ontological, and structural—was artificial. All metaphors are structural (in that they map structures to structures); all are ontological (in that they create target domain entities); and many are orientational (in that they map orientational image-schemas)." (#60 4298)

"Grady showed that complex metaphors arise from primary metaphors that are directly grounded in the everyday experience that links our sensory-motor experience to the domain of our subjective judgments." (#60 4152)

"There are primary metaphors for time, causation, events, morality, emotions, and other domains that are central to human thought. Such metaphors also provide a superstructure for our systems of complex metaphorical thought and language." (#60 4184)

"Primary metaphor is a term named by Joseph Grady for the basic connection that exist between subjective or abstract experiences such as good and concrete experiences such as up. These two concepts usually correlate in experience, and form the primary metaphor good is up. Likewise there is a correlation between seeing and knowing forming the primary metaphor seeing is knowing. Two such primary metaphors are used when understanding an expression such as glass ceiling." - Wikipedia

"LABOR IS A RESOURCE and TIME IS A RESOURCE Both of these metaphors are culturally grounded in our experience with material resources." (#60 1184)

"Material resources are typically raw materials or sources of fuel." (#60 1185)

"A material resource is a kind of substance can be quantified fairly precisely can be assigned a value per unit quantity serves a purposeful end is used up progressively as it serves its purpose" (#60 1190)

"LABOR is a kind of activity (recall: AN ACTIVITY IS A SUBSTANCE) can be quantified fairly precisely (in terms of time) can be assigned a value per unit serves a purposeful end is used up progressively as it serves it purpose" (#60 1200)

"TIME is a kind of (abstract) substance can be quantified fairly precisely can be assigned a value per unit serves a purposeful end is used up progressively as it serves its purpose" (#60 1207)

"These two SUBSTANCE metaphors permit labor and time to be quantified—that is, measured, conceived of as being progressively "used up," and assigned monetary values; they also allow us to view time and labor as things that can be "used" for various ends." (#60 1216)

"The quantification of labor in terms of time, together with the view of time as serving a purposeful end, induces a notion of LEISURE TIME, which is parallel to the concept LABOR TIME. In a society like ours, where inactivity is not considered a purposeful end, a whole industry devoted to leisure activity has evolved. As a result, LEISURE TIME becomes a RESOURCE too—to be spent productively, used wisely, saved up, budgeted, wasted, lost, etc. What is hidden by the RESOURCE metaphors for labor and time is the way our concepts of LABOR and TIME affect our concept of LEISURE, turning it into something remarkably like LABOR" (#60 1227)

"We construct arguments when we need to show the connections between things that are obvious—that we take for granted—and other things that are not obvious. We do this by putting ideas together. These ideas constitute the content of the argument. The things we take for granted are the starting point of the argument. The things we wish to show are the goals that we must reach. As we proceed toward these goals, we make progress by establishing connections. The connections may be strong or weak, and the network of connections has an overall structure. In any argument certain ideas and connections may be more basic than others, certain ideas will be more obvious than others. How good an argument is will depend on its content, the strength of the connections, how directly it establishes the connections, and how easy it is to understand the connections." (#60 1730)

"there is more to coherence than structuring in terms of multidimensional gestalts. When a concept is structured by more than one metaphor, the different metaphorical structurings usually fit together in a coherent fashion." (#60 1534)

"The difference between coherence and consistency is crucial. Each metaphor focuses on one aspect of the concept ARGUMENT: in this, each serves a single purpose. Moreover, each metaphor allows us to understand one aspect of the concept in terms of a more clearly delineated concept, e.g., JOURNEY OR CONTAINER. The reason we need two metaphors is because there is no one metaphor that will do the job—there is no one metaphor that will allow us to get a handle simultaneously on both the direction of the argument and the content of the argument. These two purposes cannot both be served at once by a single metaphor. And where the purposes won't mix, the metaphors won't mix. Thus we get instances of impermissible mixed metaphors resulting from the impossibility of a single clearly delineated metaphor that satisfies both purposes at once. For example, we can speak of the direction of the argument and of the content of the argument but not of the direction of the content of the argument nor of the content of the direction of the argument." (#60 1687)

"A shared metaphorical entailment can establish a cross-metaphorical correspondence. For example, the shared entailment AS WE MAKE AN ARGUMENT, MORE OF A SURFACE IS CREATED establishes a correspondence between the amount of ground covered in the argument (which is in the JOURNEY metaphor) and the amount of content in the argument (which is in the CONTAINER metaphor)." (#60 1711)

"Where there is an overlapping of purposes, there is an overlapping of metaphors and hence a coherence between them. Permissible mixed metaphors fall into this overlap." (#60 1717)

"At a minimum, the skills required for mutual understanding are necessary even to approach self-understanding." (#60 3873)

"Just as in mutual understanding we constantly search out commonalities of experience when we speak with other people, so in self-understanding we are always searching for what unifies our own diverse experiences in order to give coherence to our lives." (#60 3874)

"we usually comprehend our life experiences in terms of the LIFE IS A STORY metaphor. We are constantly looking for meaning in our lives by seeking out coherences that will fit some sort of coherent life story. And we constantly tell such stories and live in terms of them. As the circumstances of our lives change, we constantly revise our life stories, seeking new coherence." (#60 2970)

"The real significance of the metaphor LIFE'S ... A TALE TOLD BY AN IDIOT is that, in getting us to try to understand how it could be true, it makes possible a new understanding of our lives. It highlights the fact that we are constantly functioning under the expectation of being able to fit our lives into some coherent life story but that this expectation may be constantly frustrated when the most salient experiences in our lives, those full of sound and fury, do not fit any coherent whole and, therefore, signify nothing." (#60 2976)

"there is a similarity induced by the metaphor that goes beyond the mere similarities between the two ranges of experience. The additional similarity is a structural similarity. It involves the way we understand how the individual highlighted experiences fit together in a coherent way. The coherence is provided by the structure of what we know about producing a collaborative work of art and is reflected in the way the entailments fit together (e.g., some are entailments of work, some are entailments of art, some are entailments of COLLABORATIVE WORK, etc.). It is only this coherent structure that enables us to understand what the highlighted experiences have to do with each other and how the entailments are related to each other. Thus, by virtue of the metaphor, the range of highlighted love experiences is seen as similar in structure to the range of experiences of producing a collaborative work of art." (#60 2603)

"It is this structural similarity between the two ranges of experience that allows you to find coherence in the range of highlighted love experiences. Correspondingly, it is by virtue of the metaphor that the highlighted range of experiences is picked out as being coherent." (#60 2610)

"we have given an account of metaphorical grounding in terms of systematic correspondences in our experience, for example, being dominant in a fight and being physically up. But there is a difference between correspondences in our experience and similarities, since the correspondence need not be based on any similarity. On the basis of such correspondences in our experience, we can give an account of the range of possible metaphors. The weak homonymy position has no predictive power at all and seeks none. It simply tries to provide an after-the-fact account of what similarities there are. Thus, in the cases where similarities can be found, the weak homonymy position still gives no account of why just those similarities should be there." (#60 1996)

"Since we see similarities in terms of the categories of our conceptual system and in terms of the natural kinds of experiences we have (both of which may be metaphorical), it follows that many of the similarities that we perceive are a result of conventional metaphors that are part of our conceptual system." (#60 2554)

"there is a similarity induced by the metaphor that goes beyond the mere similarities between the two ranges of experience. The additional similarity is a structural similarity. It involves the way we understand how the individual highlighted experiences fit together in a coherent way. The coherence is provided by the structure of what we know about producing a collaborative work of art and is reflected in the way the entailments fit together (e.g., some are entailments of work, some are entailments of art, some are entailments of COLLABORATIVE WORK, etc.). It is only this coherent structure that enables us to understand what the highlighted experiences have to do with each other and how the entailments are related to each other. Thus, by virtue of the metaphor, the range of highlighted love experiences is seen as similar in structure to the range of experiences of producing a collaborative work of art." (#60 2603)

"It is this structural similarity between the two ranges of experience that allows you to find coherence in the range of highlighted love experiences. Correspondingly, it is by virtue of the metaphor that the highlighted range of experiences is picked out as being coherent." (#60 2610)

"For example, in an industrial culture such as ours there is a correlation between the amount of time a task takes and the amount of labor it takes to accomplish the task. This correlation is part of what allows us to view time and labor metaphorically as resources and hence to see a similarity between them. It is important to remember that correlations are not similarities. Metaphors that are based on correlations in our experience define concepts in terms of which we perceive similarities." (#60 2624)

"Our view that metaphors can create similarities runs counter to the classical and still most widely held theory of metaphor, namely, the comparison theory." (#60 2646)

"Our general position is that conceptual metaphors are grounded in correlations within our experience. These experiential correlations may be of two types: experiential cooccurrence and experiential similarity. An example of experiential cooccurrence would be the MORE IS UP metaphor, more is up is grounded in the cooccurrence of two types of experiences: adding more of a substance and seeing the level of the substance rise. Here there is no experiential similarity at all. An example of experiential similarity is LIFE IS A GAMBLING GAME, where one experiences actions in life as gambles, and the possible consequences of those actions are perceived as winning or losing. Here the metaphor seems to be grounded in experiential similarity. When such a metaphor is extended, we may experience new similarities between life and gambling games." (#60 2680)

"metaphor is, in general, not based on similarity, as we argued throughout this book. Instead, it is typically based on cross-domain correlations in our experience, which give rise to the perceived similarities between the two domains within the metaphor. For example, the persistent use of a metaphor may create perceived similarities, as when a love relationship, conceived of metaphorically as a partnership, goes awry when responsibilities and benefits are not shared equally." (#60 4003)

"We are using the word "prototypical" in the sense Rosch uses it in her theory of human categorization (1977). Her experiments indicate that people categorize objects, not in set-theoretical terms, but in terms of prototypes and family resemblances. For example, small flying singing birds, like sparrows, robins, etc., are prototypical birds. Chickens, ostriches, and penguins are birds but are not central members of the category—they are nonprototypical birds. But they are birds nonetheless, because they bear sufficient family resemblances to the prototype; that is, they share enough of the relevant properties of the prototype to be classified by people as birds." (#60 1274)

"On the standard objectivist view, we can understand (and hence define) an object entirely in terms of a set of its inherent properties. But, as we have just seen, at least some of the properties that characterize our concept of an object are interactional. In addition, the properties do not merely form a set but rather a structured gestalt, with dimensions that emerge naturally from our experience." (#60 2125)

"Briefly, an objectivist would say that objects have the properties they have independently of anyone who experiences them; the objects are objectively similar if they share those properties. To an objectivist it would make no sense to speak of metaphors as "creating similarities," since that would require metaphors to be able to change the nature of the external world, bringing into existence objective similarities that did not previously exist." (#60 2672)

"We agree with objectivists on one major point: that things in the world do play a role in constraining our conceptual system. But they play this role only through our experience of them. Our experiences will (1) differ from culture to culture and (2) may depend on our understanding one kind of experience in terms of another, that is, our experiences may be metaphorical in nature. Such experiences determine the categories of our conceptual system. And properties and similarities, we maintain, exist and can be experienced only relative to a conceptual system. Thus, the only kind of similarities relevant to metaphors are experiential, not objective, similarities." (#60 2675)

"Plato, typical of persuasive writers, stated his view that truth is absolute and art mere illusion by the use of a powerful rhetorical device, his Allegory of the Cave." (#60 3225)

"Aristotle, on the other hand, saw poetry as having a positive value: "It is a great thing, indeed, to make proper use of the poetic forms,... But the greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor" (Poetics 1459a); "ordinary words convey only what we know already ; it is from metaphor that we can best get hold of something fresh" (Rhetoric 1410b)." (#60 3227)

"There is an excellent reason for people to try to view a life situation in terms of an objectivist model, that is, in terms of a consistent set of metaphors. The reason is, simply, that if we can do this, we can draw inferences about the situation that will not conflict with one another. That is, we will be able to infer nonconflicting expectations and suggestions for behavior. And it is comforting—extremely comforting—to have a consistent view of the world, a clear set of expectations and no conflicts about what you should do. Objectivist models have a real appeal—and for the most human of reasons." (#60 3717)

"One obvious utility for the study of formal objectivist models in the human sciences is that they can allow us to understand, in part, the ability to reason and function in terms of a consistent set of metaphors." (#60 3729)

"The study of the building-block structure, the inherent properties of the parts, and the relationships among them has traditionally been called grammar." (#60 3453)

"This tradition is epitomized by the linguistics of Noam Chomsky, who has steadfastly maintained that grammar is a matter of pure form, independent of meaning or human understanding. Any aspect of language that involves human understanding is for Chomsky by definition outside the study of grammar in this sense." (#60 3465)

"the abstraction view claims that there is a single, very general, and abstract concept buttress, which is neutral between the building "buttress" and the argument "buttress." According to this view, "He buttressed the wall" and "He buttressed his argument" are both special cases of the same very abstract concept." (#60 1894)

"the abstraction theory would not distinguish between metaphors of the form A is Β and those of the form Β is A, since it would claim that there are neutral terms covering both domains." (#60 1914)

"Categories are open-ended. Metaphorical definitions can give us a handle on things and experiences we have already categorized, or they may lead to a recategorization. For example, viewing LOVE as WAR may make sense of certain experiences that you took as LOVE experiences of some kind or other but that you could not fit together in any meaningful way. The LOVE IS WAR metaphor may also lead you to categorize certain experiences as LOVE experiences that you had previously not viewed as such. Hedges also reveal the open-ended nature of our categories; that is, an object may often be seen as being in a category or not, depending on our purposes in classifying it. Though categories are open-ended, categorization is not random, since both metaphors and hedges define (or redefine) categories in systematic ways." (#60 2166)

"In addition to sentences that have no meaning without context, there are cases where a single sentence will mean different things to different people." (#60 263)

"Lakoff's Moral Politics (1996) analyzes the political worldviews of conservatives and progressives in America. Lakoff asks why their respective views on abortion, gun control, the death penalty, taxation, social programs, the environment, and art fit together into two opposing frameworks that are each sensible and coherent. The answer is that these views are held together by pervasive metaphors for morality that are in turn organized by opposing idealized models of the family. Conservative intellectuals have explicitly articulated the main outlines of the family-morality-politics connections, but, for the most part, progressives have not. The book provides progressives with a guide to understanding their own moral system. It shows how that system unites various kinds of progressives and what the overall moral basis is behind progressive as well as conservative politics. The analysis applies to every major social issue in America." (#60 4363)

"In the classic figure of the Grim Reaper, there is such a composition. The term "reaper" is based on the metaphor of People as Plants: just as a reaper cuts down wheat with a scythe before it has gone through its life cycle, so the Grim Reaper comes with his scythe indicating a premature death. The metaphor of Death as Departure is also part of the myth of the Grim Reaper. In the myth, the Reaper comes to the door and the deceased departs with him. The figure of the Reaper is also based on two conceptual metonymies. The Reaper takes the form of a skeleton—the form of the body after it has decayed, a form which metonymically symbolizes death. The Reaper also wears a cowl, the clothing of monks who presided over funerals at the time the figure of the Reaper became popular. Further, in the myth the Reaper is in control, presiding over the departure of the deceased from this life. Thus, the myth of the Grim Reaper is the result of two metaphors and two metonymies having been put together with precision." (#60 4105)

"Here is a simple example of a blend that recently appeared on TV: a Jewish pizza. A Jewish cooking show featured Wolfgang Puck, the noted Austrian chef from LA, famous for his elegant pizzas and married to a Jewish woman. His Jewish pizza starts with a pizza dough baked with finely sliced red onions then topped with crème fraiche (an elegant French variant of sour cream), finely chopped shallots, lox, salmon caviar, and finely chopped dill. The pizza dough is the element taken from the conventional pizza, and the Jewish elements are the lox, crème fraiche (sour cream a la Wolfgang Puck), onion, and so on. As an object in the world, the Jewish pizza is just what it is: lox, dough, onions, a cultured cream, etc. But conceptually (and tastewise), it is a blend of elements from pizzas and elements from Jewish cooking. As the Jewish pizza has become a staple of Puck's repertoire, it has become a food concept of its own. Although for the most part it leaves in place the concept of pizza and the concept of Jewish cooking, it makes a slight extension of both concepts and thereby extends the idea of Jewish cooking and the idea of what a pizza is." (#60 4256)