experiential correlations: experiential cooccurrence and experiential similarity

"Our general position is that conceptual metaphors are grounded in correlations within our experience. These experiential correlations may be of two types: experiential cooccurrence and experiential similarity. An example of experiential cooccurrence would be the MORE IS UP metaphor, more is up is grounded in the cooccurrence of two types of experiences: adding more of a substance and seeing the level of the substance rise. Here there is no experiential similarity at all. An example of experiential similarity is LIFE IS A GAMBLING GAME, where one experiences actions in life as gambles, and the possible consequences of those actions are perceived as winning or losing. Here the metaphor seems to be grounded in experiential similarity. When such a metaphor is extended, we may experience new similarities between life and gambling games." (#60 2680)

Metaphors are learned when two experiences occur at once

"Metaphors are learned when two experiences occur at once. If a metaphorical link would result in a contradiction in the target domain, it will not be learned. Neurally, contradictions are mutual inhibitions. Any would-be link that would lead to a contradiction with the inherent structure of the target domain will be inhibited; thus it will never be learned." (#60 4201)

Neurons that fire together wire together

"As the saying goes in neuroscience, "Neurons that fire together wire together. " Appropriate neural connections between the brain regions are recruited." (#60 4178)

difference between correspondences in our experience and similarities

"we have given an account of metaphorical grounding in terms of systematic correspondences in our experience, for example, being dominant in a fight and being physically up. But there is a difference between correspondences in our experience and similarities, since the correspondence need not be based on any similarity. On the basis of such correspondences in our experience, we can give an account of the range of possible metaphors. The weak homonymy position has no predictive power at all and seeks none. It simply tries to provide an after-the-fact account of what similarities there are. Thus, in the cases where similarities can be found, the weak homonymy position still gives no account of why just those similarities should be there." (#60 1996)